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The Right to Lie:  Kant on Dealing with Evil
 
Christine M. Korsgaard 
 
   
  One  of  the  great  difficulties  with  Kant's  moral  philosophy  is  that  it  seems  to 
imply that our moral obligations leave us powerless in the face of evil.  Kant's theory 
sets a high ideal of conduct and tells us to live up to that ideal regardless of what other 
persons are doing.  The results may be very bad.  But Kant says that the law "remains 
in  full  force,  because  it  commands  categorically."  (G  438-439/57)
    The  most  well-
known example of this "rigorism", as it is sometimes called, concerns Kant's views on 
our duty to tell the truth. 
  In two passages in his ethical writings, Kant seems to endorse the following pair 
of claims about this duty: First, one must never under any circumstances or for any 
purpose  tell  a  lie.    Second,  if  one  does  tell  a  lie  one  is  responsible  for  all  of  the 
consequences that ensue, even if they were completely unforeseeable. 
  One of the two passages occurs in the Metaphysical Principles of Virtue. There 
Kant classifies lying as a violation of a perfect duty to oneself. In one of the casuistical 
questions, a servant, under instructions, tells a visitor the lie that his master is not at 
home.  His master, meanwhile, sneaks off and commits a crime, which would have been 
prevented by the watchman sent to arrest him.  Kant says: 
Upon whom ... does the blame fall?  To be sure, also upon 
the servant, who here violated a duty to himself by lying, 
the consequence of which will now be imputed to him by 
his own conscience.  (MMV 431/93)    
The other passage is the infamous one about the murderer at the door from the essay, 
"On A Supposed Right to Lie From Altruistic Motives."  Here Kant's claims are more 
extreme, for he says that the liar may be held legally as well as ethically responsible for 
the consequences, and the series of coincidences he imagines is even more fantastic: 
 After  you  have  honestly  answered  the  murderer's 
question as to whether his intended victim is at home, it 
may be that he has slipped out so that he does not come 
in the way of the murderer, and thus that the murder may 
not be committed.  But if you had lied and said he was not 
at  home  when  he  had  really  gone  out  without  your 
knowing it, and if the murderer had then met him as he 
went  away  and  murdered  him,  you  might  justly  be 
accused as the cause of his death.  For if you had told the 
truth as far as you knew it, perhaps the murderer might 
have  been  apprehended  by  the  neighbors  while  he 
searched the house and thus the  deed  might  have been 
prevented. (SRL 427/348)  
   Kant's readers differ about whether Kant's moral philosophy commits him to the 
claims he makes in these passages.  Unsympathetic readers are inclined to take them 
as evidence of the horrifying conclusions to which Kant was led by his notion that the 
necessity in duty is rational necessity - as if Kant were clinging to a logical point in the 
teeth of moral  decency.   Such readers take these conclusions  as a  defeat for Kant's 
ethics, or for ethical rationalism generally; or they take Kant to have confused principles 
which  are  merely  general  in  their  application  and  prima  facie    in  their  truth  with 
absolute and universal laws.  Sympathetic readers are likely to argue that Kant here 
mistook  the  implications  of  his  own  theory,  and  to  try  to  show  that,  by  careful 
construction  and  accurate  testing  of  the  maxim  on  which  this  liar  acts,  Kant's 
conclusions can be blocked by his own procedures. 
  Sympathetic and unsympathetic readers alike have focused their attention on 
the implications of the first formulation of the categorical imperative, the Formula of 
Universal Law.  The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals contains two other sets of 
terms in which the categorical imperative is formulated:  the treatment of humanity as 
an end in itself, and autonomy, or legislative membership in a Kingdom of Ends.  My 
treatment of the issue falls into three parts.  First, I want to argue that Kant's defenders 
are right in thinking that, when the case is treated under the Formula of Universal Law, 
this particular lie can be shown to be permissible.  Second, I want to argue that when 
the case is treated from the perspective provided by the Formulas of Humanity and the 
Kingdom  of  Ends,  it  becomes  clear  why  Kant  is  committed  to  the  view  that  lying  is 
wrong in every case.  But from this perspective we see that Kant's rigorism about lying 
is not the result of a misplaced love of consistency or legalistic thinking.  Instead, it 
comes  from  an  attractive  ideal  of  human  relations  which  is  the  basis  of  his  ethical 
system.  If Kant is wrong in his conclusion about lying to the murderer at the door, it is 
for the interesting and important reason that morality itself sometimes allows or even 
requires us to do something that from an ideal perspective is wrong.   The case does not 
impugn  Kant's  ethics  as  an  ideal  system.    Instead,  it  shows  that  we  need  special 
principles for dealing with evil.  My third aim is to discuss the structure that an ethical 
system must have in order to accommodate such special principles.   
                                                                                                                                                    
Universal Law 
  The Formula of Universal Law tells us never to act on a maxim that we could not 
at the same time will to be a universal law.   A maxim which cannot even be conceived 
as a universal law without contradiction is in violation of a strict and perfect duty, one 
which assigns us a particular action or omission.  A maxim which cannot be willed as 
universal  law  without  contradicting  the  will  is  in  violation  of  a  broad  and  imperfect 
duty, one which assigns us an end, but does not tell us what or how much we should 
do towards it.  Maxims of lying are violations of perfect duty, and so are supposed to be 
the kind that cannot be conceived without contradiction when universalized.   
  The sense in which the universalization of an immoral maxim  is supposed to 
"contradict" itself is a matter of controversy.  On my reading, which I will not defend 
here
,  the  contradiction  in  question  is  a  "practical"  one:    the  universalized  maxim 
contradicts itself when the efficacy of the action as a method of achieving its purpose 
would be undermined by its universal practice.  So, to use Kant's example, the point 
against false promising as a method of getting ready cash is that if everyone attempted 
to  use  false  promising  as  a  method  of  getting  ready  cash,  false  promising  would  no 
longer work as a method of getting ready cash, since, as Kant says,  "no one would 
believe what was promised to him but would only laugh at any such assertion as vain 
pretense."  (G 422/40) 
   Thus the test question will  be:   could this  action  be the universal method of 
achieving this purpose?   Now when we consider lying in general, it looks as if it could 
not  be  the  universal  method  of  doing  anything.    For  lies  are  usually  efficacious  in 
achieving their purposes because they deceive, but if they were universally practiced 
they would not deceive.  We believe what is said to us in a given context because most 
of the time people in that context say what they really think or intend.  In contexts in 
which people usually say false things - e.g., when telling stories that are jokes - we are 
not deceived.  If a story that is a joke and is false counts as a lie, we can say that a lie 
in this case is not wrong, because the universal practice of lying in the context of jokes 
does not interfere with the purpose of jokes, which is to amuse and does not depend on 
deception.  But in most cases lying falls squarely into the category of the sort of action 
Kant considers wrong:  actions whose efficacy depends upon the fact that most people 
do not engage in them, and which therefore can only be performed by someone who 
makes an exception of himself. (G 424/42) 
  When we try to apply this test to the case of the murderer at the door, however, 
we  run  into  a  difficulty.    The  difficulty  derives  from  the  fact  that  there  is  probably 
already deception in the case.  If murderers standardly came to the door and said:  "I 
wish to murder your friend  - is  he here in your house?" then perhaps the universal 
practice  of  lying  in  order  to  keep  a  murderer  from  his  victim  would  not  work.    If 
everyone  lied  in  these  circumstances  the  murderer  would  be  aware  of  that  fact  and 
would not be deceived by your answer.  But the murderer is not likely to do this, or, in 
any event, this is not how I shall imagine the case.  A murderer who expects to conduct 
his business by asking questions must suppose that you do not know who he is and 
what he has in mind.
   If these are the circumstances, and we try to ascertain whether 
there could be a universal practice of lying in these circumstances, the answer appears 
to be yes.  The lie will be efficacious even if universally practiced.  But the reason it will 
be efficacious is rather odd:  it is because the murderer supposes you do not know what 
circumstances you are in - that is, that you do not know you are addressing a murderer 
- and so does not conclude from the fact that people in those circumstances always lie 
that you will lie. 
  The same point can be made readily using Kant's publicity criterion. (PP 381-
383/129-131)  Can  we  announce  in  advance  our  intention  of  lying  to  murderers 
without,  as  Kant  says,  vitiating  our  own  purposes  by  publishing  our  maxims?  (PP 
383/131)  Again the answer is yes.  It does not matter if you say publicly that you will 
lie in such a situation, for the murderer supposes that you do not know you are in that 
situation.
   
  These reflections might lead us to believe, then, that Kant was wrong in thinking 
that it is never all right to lie.  It is permissible to lie to deceivers in order to counteract 
the  intended  results  of  their  deceptions,  for  the  maxim  of  lying  to  a  deceiver  is 
universalizable.  The deceiver has, so to speak, placed himself in a morally unprotected 
position  by  his  own  deception.    He  has  created  a  situation  which  universalization 
cannot reach. 
                                                                                                                                                    
Humanity 
  When we apply the Formula of Humanity, however, the argument against lying 
that results applies to any lie whatever.   The formula runs: 
Act  so  that  you  treat  humanity,  whether  in  your  own 
person or in that of another, always as an end and never 
as a means only. (G 429/47) 
  In order to use this formula for casuistical purposes, we need to specify what 
counts as treating humanity as an end.   "Humanity" is used by Kant specifically to 
refer  to  the  capacity  to  determine  ends  through  rational  choice.  (G  437/56;  MMV 
392/50) Imperfect duties arise from the obligation to make the exercise, preservation, 
and development of this capacity itself an end.  The perfect duties - that is, the duties of 
justice, and, in the realm of ethics, the duties of respect - arise from the obligation to 
make each human being's capacity for autonomous choice the condition of the value of 
every other end.   
   In  his  treatment  of  the  lying  promise  case  under  the  Formula  of  Humanity, 
Kant makes the following comments: 
For he whom I want to use for my own purposes by means 
of such a promise cannot possibly assent to my mode of 
acting  against  him  and  cannot  contain  the  end  of  this 
action in himself. ... he who transgresses the rights of men 
intends  to  make  use  of  the  persons  of  others  merely  as 
means, without considering that as rational beings, they 
must always be esteemed at the same time as ends, i.e. 
only as beings who must be able to contain in themselves 
the end of the very same action.   
(G 429-430/48) 
In these passages, Kant uses two expressions that are the key to understanding the 
derivation of perfect duties to others from the Formula of Humanity.  One is that the 
other person "cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting toward him" and the second 
is  that  the  other  person  cannot  "contain  the  end  of  this  action  in  himself."    These 
phrases provide us with a test for  perfect duties to others:  an action  is  contrary to 
perfect duty if it is not possible for the other to assent to it or to hold its end.  
   It is important to see that these phrases do not mean  simply that the other 
person does not or would not assent to the transaction or that she does not happen to 
have the same end I do, but strictly that she cannot  do so:  that something makes it 
impossible.  If what we cannot assent to means merely what we are likely to be annoyed 
by, the test will be subjective and the claim that the person does not assent to being 
used as a means will sometimes be false.  The object you steal from me may be the gift I 
intended for you, and we may both have been motivated by the desire that you should 
have it.  And I may care about you too much or too little to be annoyed by the theft. For 
all that this must be a clear case of your using me as a mere means.
   
  So it must not be merely that your victim will not like the way that you propose 
to act, that this is psychologically unlikely, but that something makes it impossible for 
her to assent to it. Similarly, it must be argued that something makes it impossible for 
her to hold the end of the very same action.  Kant never spells out why it is impossible, 
but it is not difficult to see what he has in mind.  
   People cannot assent to a way of acting when they are given no chance to do so.  
The  most  obvious  instance  of  this  is  when  coercion  is  used.    But  it  is  also  true  of 
deception:  the victim of the false promise cannot assent to it because he doesn't know 
it is what he is being offered.  But even when the victim of such conduct does happen to 
know what is going on there is a sense in which he cannot assent to it.  Suppose, for 
example, that you come to me and ask to borrow some money, falsely promising to pay 
it back next week, and suppose that by some chance I know perfectly well that your 
promise is a lie.  Suppose also that I have the same end you do, in the sense that I want 
you to have the money, so that I turn the money over to you anyway.  Now here I have 
the same end that you do, and I tolerate your attempts to deceive me to the extent that 
they do not prevent my giving you the money.  Even in this case I cannot really assent 
to the transaction you propose.  We can imagine the case in a number of different ways.  
If I call your bluff openly and say "never mind that nonsense, just take this money" then 
what  I  am  doing  is  not  accepting  a  false  promise,  but  giving  you  a  handout,  and 
scorning  your  promise.    The  nature  of  the  transaction  is  changed:    now  it  is  not  a 
promise but a handout.  If I don't call you on it, but keep my own counsel, it is still the 
same.  I am not accepting a false promise.  In this case what I am doing is pretending to 
accept your false promise.  But there is all the difference in the world between actually 
doing something and pretending to do it.  In neither of these cases can I be described as 
accepting a false promise, for in both cases I fix it so that it is something else that is 
happening.  My knowledge of what is going on makes it impossible for me to accept the 
deceitful promise in the ordinary way. 
  The question whether another can assent to your way of acting can serve as a 
criterion for judging whether you are treating her as a mere means.  We will say that 
knowledge of what is going on and some power over the proceedings are the conditions 
of possible assent; without these, the concept of assent does not apply. This gives us 
another way to formulate the test for treating someone as a mere means:  Suppose it is 
the case that if the other person knows what you are trying to do and has the power to 
stop you, then what you are trying to do cannot be what is really happening.  If this is 
the case, the action is one that by its very nature is impossible for the other to assent 
to.  You cannot wrest from me what I freely give to you; and if I have the power to stop 
you from wresting something from me and do not use it, I am in a sense freely giving it 
to you.  This is of course not intended as a legal point:  the point is that any action 
which  depends for its  nature and efficacy  on the  other's ignorance or  powerlessness 
fails this test.  Lying clearly falls into this category of action:  it only deceives when the 
other does not know that it is a lie.
 
  A similar analysis can be given of the possibility of holding the end of the very 
same action.  In cases of violation of perfect duty, lying included, the other person is 
unable to hold the end of the very same action because the way that you act prevents 
her from choosing whether to contribute to the realization of that end or not.   Again, 
this is obviously true when someone is forced to contribute to an end, but it is also true 
in cases of deception.  If you give a lying promise to get some money, the other person is 
invited to think that the end she is contributing to is your temporary possession of the 
money:  in fact, it is your permanent possession of it.  It doesn't matter whether that 
would be all right with her if she knew about it.  What matters is that she never gets a 
chance to choose the end, not knowing that it is to be the consequence of her action. 
   
  According  to  the  Formula  of  Humanity,  coercion  and  deception  are  the  most 
fundamental  forms  of  wrongdoing  to  others  -  the  roots  of  all  evil.    Coercion  and 
deception violate the  conditions of  possible assent, and all actions  which  depend for 
their nature and efficacy on their coercive or deceptive character are ones that others 
cannot assent to.  Coercion and deception also make it impossible for others to choose 
to contribute to our ends.  This in turn makes it impossible, according to Kant's value 
theory, for the ends of such actions to be good.  For on Kant's view "what we call good 
must be, in the judgement of every reasonable man, an object of the faculty of desire."  
(C2  60/62-63)  If your end is one that others cannot choose - not because of what they 
want, but because they are not in a position to choose - it cannot, as the end of that 
action, be good.  This means that in any cooperative project - whenever you need the 
decisions and actions of others in order to bring about your end - everyone who is to 
contribute must be in a position to choose to contribute to the end.   
  The sense in which a good end is an object for everyone is that a good end is in 
effect one that everyone, in principle, and especially everyone who contributes to it, gets 
to cast a vote on.  This voting, or legislation, is the prerogative of rational beings; and 
the ideal of a world in which this prerogative is realized is the Kingdom of Ends. 
 
The Kingdom of Ends 
  The Kingdom of Ends is represented by the kingdom of nature;  we determine 
moral laws by considering their viability as natural laws.    On Kant's view, the will is a 
kind of causality. (G 446/64)    A person, an end in itself, is a free cause, which is to 
say a first cause.  By contrast a thing, a means, is a merely mediate cause, a link in the 
chain.      A  first  cause  is,  obviously,  the  initiator  of  a  causal  chain,  hence  a  real 
determiner  of  what  will  happen.    The  idea  of  deciding  for  yourself  whether  you  will 
contribute  to  a  given  end  can  be  represented  as  a  decision  whether  to  initiate  that 
causal chain which constitutes your contribution.  Any action which prevents or diverts 
you from making this initiating decision is one that treats you as a mediate rather than 
a first cause; hence as a mere means, a thing, a tool.  Coercion and deception both do 
this.  And deception treats you as a mediate cause in a specific way:  it treats your 
reason as a mediate cause.  The false promiser thinks:  if I tell her I will pay her back 
next week, then she will choose to give me the money.  Your reason is worked, like a 
machine:  the deceiver tries to determine what levers to pull to get the desired results 
from you.   Physical coercion treats someone's person as a tool; lying treats someone's 
reason  as  a  tool.    This  is  why  Kant  finds  it  so  horrifying;  it  is  a  direct  violation  of 
autonomy. 
   We may say that a tool has two essential characteristics:  It is there to be used, 
and it does not control itself:  its nature is to be directed by something else.  To treat 
someone as a mere means is to treat her as if these things were true of her.  Kant's 
treatment of our duties to others in the Metaphysical Principles of Virtue is sensitive to 
both characteristics.  We are not only forbidden to use another as mere means to our 
private purposes.  We are also forbidden to take attitudes towards her which involve 
regarding her as not in control of herself, which is to say, as not using her reason.  
  This latter is the basis of the duties of respect.  Respect is violated by the vices 
of  calumny  and  mockery  (MMV  466-468/131-133):    we  owe  to  others  not  only  a 
practical  generosity  toward  their  plans  and  projects  -  a  duty  of  aid  -  but  also  a 
generosity of attitude toward their thoughts and motives.  To treat another with respect 
is to treat him as if he were using his reason and as far as possible as if he were using it 
well.    Even  in  a  case  where  someone  evidently  is  wrong  or  mistaken,  we  ought  to 
suppose he must have what he takes to be good reasons for what he believes or what he 
does.  This is not because, as a matter of fact, he probably does have good reasons.  
Rather, this attitude is something that we owe to him, something that is his right.  And 
he cannot forfeit it.   Kant is explicit about this: 
Hereupon is founded a  duty to  respect man even  in the 
logical use of his reason:  not to censure someone's errors 
under  the  name  of  absurdity,  inept  judgement,  and  the 
like, but rather to suppose that in such an inept judgment 
there must be something true, and to seek it out.  ...  Thus 
it is also with the reproach of vice, which must never burst 
out in complete contempt or deny the wrongdoer all moral 
worth,  because  on  that  hypothesis  he  could  never  be 
improved either -- and this latter is incompatible with the 
idea of man, who as such (as a moral being) can never lose 
all predisposition to good.  (MMV 463-464/l28-l29) 
  To treat others as ends in themselves is always to address and deal with them 
as rational beings.  Every rational being gets to reason out, for herself, what she is to 
think or to choose or to do.  So if you need someone's contribution to your end, you 
must put the facts before her and ask for her contribution. If you think she is doing 
something wrong, you may try to convince her by argument but you may not resort to 
tricks or force.  The Kingdom of Ends is a democratic ideal, and poor judgment does not 
disqualify anyone for citizenship.  In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant says: 
Reason  depends  on  this  freedom  for  its  very  existence.  
For  reason  has  no  dictatorial  authority;  its  verdict  is 
always  simply  the  agreement  of  free  citizens,  of  whom 
each  one  must  be  permitted  to  express,  without  let  or 
hindrance, his objections or even his veto.
 
This means that there cannot be a good reason for taking a decision out of someone 
else's hands. It is a rational  being's prerogative, as a first cause, to have a share  in 
determining the destiny of things.    
  This shows us in another way why lying is for Kant a paradigm case of treating 
someone as a mere means.  Any attempt to control the actions and reactions of another 
by  any  means  except  an  appeal  to  reason  treats  her  as  a  mere  means,  because  it 
attempts  to  reduce  her  to  a  mediate  cause.    This  includes  much  more  than  the 
utterance of falsehoods. In the Lectures on Ethics, Kant says "whatever militates against 
frankness lowers the dignity of man." (LE 231) 
 It is an everyday temptation, even (or 
perhaps especially) in our dealings with those close to us, to withhold something, or to 
tidy up an anecdote, or to embellish a story, or even just to place a certain emphasis, in 
order to be sure of getting the reaction we want.
   Kant holds the Socratic view that 
any sort of persuasion that is aimed at distracting its listener's attention from either the 
reasons that she ought to use or the reasons the speaker thinks she will use is wrong.
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  In light of this account  it is possible to explain why Kant  says what he  does 
about  the  liar's  responsibility.    In  a  Kantian  theory  our  responsibility  has  definite 
boundaries:  each person as a first cause exerts some influence on what happens, and 
it is your part that is up to you.  If you make a straightforward appeal to the reason of 
another  person,  your  responsibility  ends  there  and  the  other's  responsibility  begins.  
But the liar tries to take the consequences out of the hands of others; he, and not they, 
will determine what form their contribution to destiny will take.  By refusing to share 
with others the determination of events, the liar takes the world into his own hands, 
and makes the events his own.  The results, good or bad, are imputable to him, at least 
in his own conscience.  It does not follow from this, of course, that this is a risk one will 
never want to take. 
 
Humanity and Universal Law 
  If the foregoing casuistical analyses are correct, then applying the Formula of 
Universal Law and applying the Formula of Humanity lead to rather different answers 
in the case of lying to the murderer at the door.  The former seems to say that this lie is 
permissible, but the latter says that coercion and deception are the most fundamental 
forms of wrongdoing.  In a Kingdom of Ends coercive and deceptive methods can never 
be used.   
  This result impugns Kant's belief that the formulas are equivalent.  But it is not 
necessary to conclude that the formulas flatly say different things, and are unrelated 
except  for  a  wide  range  of  coincidence  in  their  results.    For  one  thing,  lying  to  the 
murderer at the door was not shown to be permissible in a straightforward manner:  the 
maxim did not so much pass as evade universalization.  For another, the two formulas 
can be shown to be expressions of the same basic theory of justification.  Suppose that 
your  maxim  is  in  violation  of  the  Formula  of  Universal  Law.    You  are  making  an 
exception of yourself, doing something that everyone in your circumstances could not 
do. What this means is that you are treating the reason you  have for the action as if it 
were stronger, had more justifying force, than anyone else's exactly similar reason.  You 
are then acting as if the fact that it was in particular your  reason, and not just the 
reason of a human being, gave it special weight and force.  This is an obvious violation 
of  the  idea  that  it  is  your  humanity  -  your  power  of  rational  choice  -  which  is  the 
condition of all value and so which gives your needs and desires the justifying force of 
reasons.   Thus, any violation of the Formula of Universal Law is also a violation of the 
Formula of Humanity.  This argument, of course, only goes in one direction:  it does not 
show that the two formulas are equivalent.  The Formula of Humanity is more strict 
than the Formula of Universal Law - but both are expressions of the same basic theory 
of value:  that your rational nature is the source of justifying power of your reasons, 
and so of the goodness of your ends.  
  And although the Formula of Humanity gives us reason to think that all lies are 
wrong, we can still give an account in the terms it provides of what vindicates lying to a 
liar. The liar tries to use your reason as a means - your honesty as a tool. You do not 
have to passively submit to being used as a means. In the Lectures on Ethics, this is the 
line that Kant in fact takes.  He says: 
if  we  were  to  be  at  all  times  punctiliously  truthful  we 
might  often  become  victims  of  the  wickedness  of  others 
who were ready to abuse our truthfulness.  If all men were 
well-intentioned it would not only be a duty not to lie, but 
no one would do so because there would be no point in it.  
But as men are malicious, it cannot be denied that to be 
punctiliously truthful is often dangerous... if I cannot save 
myself by maintaining silence, then my lie is a weapon of 
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The common thought that lying to a liar is a form of self-defense, that you can resist 
lies with lies as you can resist force with force, is  according to this analysis correct.
  
This  should  not  be  surprising,  for  we  have  seen  that  deception  and  coercion  are 
parallel.   Lying and the use of force are attempts to undercut the two conditions of 
possible assent to actions and of autonomous choice of ends, namely, knowledge and 
power.  So, although the Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of Humanity give 
us  different  results,  this  does  not  show  that  they  simply  express  different  moral 
outlooks.  The relation between them is more complex than that.   
 
Two Casuistical Problems 
  Before I discuss this relation, however, I must take up two casuistical problems 
arising from the view I have presented so far.  First, I have argued that we may  lie to 
the murderer at the door.  But most people think something stronger, that we ought to 
lie to the murderer - that we will have done something wrong if we do not.  Second, I 
have argued that it is permissible to lie to a deceiver in order to counter the deception.  
But what if someone lies to you for a good end, and, as it happens, you know about it?   
The fact that the murderer's end  is evil has played no direct role in the arguments I 
have given so far.  We have a right to resist liars and those who try to use force because 
of their methods, not because of their purposes.  In one respect this is a virtue of my 
argument.    It  does  not  license  us  to  lie  to  or  to  use  violence  against  persons  just 
because we think their purposes are bad.  But it looks as if it may license us to lie to 
liars whose purposes are good. Here is a case
:  suppose someone comes to your door 
and pretends to be taking a survey of some sort.  In fact, this person is a philanthropist 
who wants to give his money to people who meet certain criteria, and this is his way of 
discovering appropriate objects for his beneficence.  As it happens, you know what is 
up.  By lying, you could get some money, although you do not in fact meet his criteria. 
The  argument  that  I  derived  from  the  Formula  of  Universal  Law  about  lying  to  the 
murderer applies here.  Universalizing the lie to the philanthropist will not destroy its 
efficacy.  Even if it is a universal law that everyone will lie in these circumstances, the 
philanthropist  thinks  you  do  not  know  you  are  in  these  circumstances.    By  my 
argument, it is permissible to lie in this case.  The philanthropist, like the murderer, 
has placed himself in a morally unprotected position by his own deception.   
  Start  with  the  first  casuistical  problem.    There  are  two  reasons  to  lie  to  the 
murderer at the door.  First, we have a duty of mutual aid.  This is an imperfect duty of 
virtue, since the law does not say exactly what or how much we must do along these 
lines.  This duty gives us a reason to tell the lie.  Whether it makes the lie imperative 
depends on how one understands the duty of mutual aid, on how one understands the 
"wideness" of imperfect duties.
  It may be that on such an urgent occasion, the lie is 
imperative.  Notice that if the lie were impermissible, this duty would have no force.  
Imperfect duties are always secondary to perfect ones.  But if the lie is permissible, this 
duty will provide a reason, whether or not an imperative one, to tell the lie. 
  The second reason is one of self-respect.  The murderer wants to make you a 
tool of evil; he regards your integrity as a useful sort of predictability.  He is trying to 
use you, and your good will, as a means to an evil end.  You owe it to humanity in your 
own person not to allow your honesty to be used as a resource for evil.  I think this 
would  be  a  perfect  duty  of  virtue;  Kant  does  not  say  this  specifically  but  in  his 
discussion of servility (the avoidance of which is a perfect duty of virtue) he says "Do not 
suffer your rights to be trampled underfoot by others with impunity."  (MMV 436/99) 
  Both  of  these  reasons  spring  from  duties  of  virtue.    A  person  with  a  good 
character will tell the lie.  Not to tell it is morally bad.  But there is no duty of justice to 
tell the lie.  If we do not tell it, we cannot be punished, or, say, treated as an accessory 
to the murder.   Kant would insist that even if the lie ought to be told this does not 
mean that the punctiliously truthful person who does not tell it is somehow implicated 
in the murder.  It is the murderer, not the truthful person, who commits this crime.  
Telling the truth cannot be part of the crime.  On Kant's view, persons are not supposed 
to be responsible for managing each other's conduct.  If the lie were a duty of justice, we 
would be responsible for that. 
  These reflections will help us to think about the second casuistical problem, the 
lie to the philanthropist.  I think it does follow from the line of argument I have taken 
that  the  lie  cannot  be  shown  to  be  impermissible.    Although  the  philanthropist  can 
hardly be called evil, he is doing something tricky and underhanded, which Kant's view 
disapproves.  He should not use this method of getting the information he wants.  This 
is especially true if the reason he does not use a more straightforward method is that he 
assumes that if he does people will lie to him.  We are not supposed to base our actions 
on the asssumption that other people will behave badly.  Assuming this does not occur 
in an institutional context, and you have not sworn that your remarks were true
, the 
philanthropist will have no recourse to justice if you lie to him.  But the reasons that 
favor telling the lie that exist in the first case do not exist here.  According to Kant, you 
do not have a duty to promote your own happiness.   Nor would anyone perform such 
an action out of self-respect.  This is, in a very trivial way, a case of dealing with evil. 
But you can best deal with it by telling the philanthropist that you know what he is up 
to,  perhaps  even  that  you  find  it  sneaky.    This  is  because  the  ideal  that  makes  his 
action a bad one is an ideal of straightforwardness in human relations. This would also 
be the best way to deal with the murderer, if it were a way to deal with a murderer.  But 
of course it is not. 
   
Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory 
  I now turn to the question of  what structure an  ethical theory must  have in 
order  to  accommodate  this  way  of  thinking.    In  A  Theory  of  Justice,
  John  Rawls 
proposes a division of moral philosophy into ideal and non-ideal theory.   In that work, 
the task of ideal theory is to determine "what a perfectly just society would be like," 
while non-ideal theory deals with punishment, war, opposition to unjust regimes, and 
compensatory justice. (§2,p. 8-9)  Since I wish to use this feature of Rawls's theory for a 
model, I am going to sketch his strategy for what I will call a double-level theory.   
  Rawls identifies two conceptions of justice, which he calls the general conception 
and  the  special  conception.  (§§11,26,39,46)  The  general  conception  tells  us  that  all 
goods  distributed  by society,  including  liberty and opportunity, are to  be distributed 
equally unless an unequal distribution is to the advantage of everyone, and especially 
those who fall on the low side of the inequality. (§13)  Injustice, according to the general 
conception,  occurs  whenever  there  are  inequalities  that  are  not  to  the  benefit  of 
everyone.(§11, p. 62)  The special conception in its most developed form removes liberty 
and  opportunity  from  the  scope  of  this  principle  and  says  they  must  be  distributed 
equally,  forbidding tradeoffs  of these  goods  for  economic gains.  It also introduces a 
number  of  priority  rules,  for  example,  the  priority  of  liberty  over  all  other 
considerations, and the priority of equal opportunity over economic considerations. (§§ 
11,46,82) 
  Ideal theory is worked out under certain assumptions.  One is strict compliance:  
it is assumed that everyone will act justly.  The other, a little harder to specify, is that 
historical,  economic,  and  natural  conditions  are  such  that  realization  of  the  ideal  is 
feasible.  Our conduct towards those who do not comply, or in circumstances which 
make the immediate realization of a just state of affairs impossible, is governed by the 
principles of non-ideal theory.  Certain ongoing natural conditions which may always 
prevent the full realization of the ideal state of affairs also belong to non-ideal theory:  
the problems of dealing with the seriously ill or mentally disturbed, for instance, belong 
in this category.  For purposes of constructing ideal theory, we assume that everyone is 
"rational and able to manage their own affairs."  (§39, p. 248)  We also assume in ideal 
theory that there are no massive historic injustices, such as the oppression of blacks 
and women, to be corrected.  The point is to work out our ideal view of justice on the 
assumption that people, nature, and history will behave themselves so that the ideal 
can be realized, and then to determine - in light of that ideal - what is to be done in 
actual circumstances, when they do not.  The special conception is not applied without 
regard to circumstances.  Special principles will be used in non-ideal conditions. 
  Non-ideal conditions exist when, or to the extent that, the special conception of 
justice  cannot  be  realized  effectively.    In  these  circumstances  our  conduct  is  to  be 
determined in the following way:  the special conception becomes a goal, rather than an 
ideal to live up to:  we are to work towards the conditions in which it is feasible.  For 
instance, suppose there is a case like this:  widespread poverty or ignorance due to the 
level of economic development is such that the legal establishment of the equal liberties 
makes no real difference to lot of the disadvantaged members of society.  It's an empty 
formality.  On the other hand, some inequality, temporarily instituted, would actually 
tend to foster conditions in which equal liberty could become a reality for everyone.  In 
these  circumstances, Rawls's double-level theory allows for the temporary inequality. 
(§§  11,39)    The  priority  rules  give  us  guidance  as  to  which  features  of  the  special 
conception are most urgent.  These are the ones that we should be striving to achieve as 
soon as possible.  For example, if formal equal opportunity for blacks and women is 
ineffective, affirmative action measures may be in order.  If some people claim that this 
causes inefficiency at first, it is neither here nor there, since equality of opportunity has 
priority over efficiency.  The special conception may also tell us which of our non-ideal 
options is least bad, closest to ideal conduct.  For instance, civil disobedience is better 
than a resort to violence not only because violence is bad in itself, but because of the 
way in which civil disobedience expresses the democratic principles of the just society it 
aspires  to  bring  about.  (§  59)  Finally,  the  general  conception  of  justice  commands 
categorically.  In sufficiently bad circumstances none of the characteristic features of 
the special conception may be realizable.  But there is no excuse, ever, for violation of 
the general conception.  If inequalities are not benefiting those on the lower end of them 
in some way, they are simply oppression.  The general conception, then, represents the 
point at which justice becomes uncompromising.
   
  A double-level theory can be contrasted to two types of single-level theory, both 
of which in a sense fail to distinguish the way we should behave in ideal and in non-
ideal conditions, but which are at opposite extremes.  A consequentialist theory such as 
utilitarianism does not really distinguish ideal from non-ideal conditions.  Of course, 
the utilitarian can see the difference between a state of affairs in which everyone can be 
made reasonably happy and a state of affairs in which the utilitarian choice must be for 
the "lesser of evils", but it is still really a matter of degree.  In principle we do not know 
what counts as a state in which everyone is "as happy as possible" absolutely.  Instead, 
the  utilitarian  wants  to  make  everyone  as  happy  as  possible  relative  to  the 
circumstances,  and  pursues  this  goal  holds  regardless  of  how  friendly  the 
circumstances are to human happiness.  The difference is not between ideal and non-
ideal states of affairs but simply between better and worse states of affairs. 
  Kant's theory as he understood it represents the other extreme  of single-level 
theory.  The standard of conduct he sets for us is designed for an ideal state of affairs:  
we are always to act as as if we were living in a Kingdom of Ends, regardless of possible 
disastrous results.  Kant is by no means dismissive towards the distressing problems 
caused by the evil conduct of other human beings and the unfriendliness of nature to 
human ideals, but his solution to these problems is different.  He finds in them grounds 
for a morally motivated religious faith in God.
  Our rational motive for belief in a moral 
author  of  the  world  derives  from  our  rational  need  for  grounds  for  hope  that  these 
problems will be resolved.  Such an author would have designed the laws of nature so 
that,  in  ways  that  are  not  apparent  to  us,  our  moral  actions  and  efforts  do  tend  to 
further the realization of an actual Kingdom of Ends.  With faith in God, we can trust 
that a Kingdom of Ends will be the consequence of our actions as well as the ideal that 
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  In  his  A  Critique  of  Utilitarianism 
,  Bernard  Williams  spells  out  some  of  the 
unfortunate  consequences  of  what  I  am  calling  single-level  theories.    According  to 
Williams, the consequentialist's commitment to doing whatever is necessary to secure 
the  best  outcome  may  lead  to  violations  of  what  we  would  ordinarily  think  of  as 
integrity.  There is no kind of action that is so mean or so savage that it can never lead 
to a better outcome than the alternatives.  A commitment to always securing the best 
outcome never allows you to say "bad consequences or not, this is not the sort of thing I 
do;  I am not that sort of  person."  And no  matter how mean  or how  savage the act 
required to secure the best outcome is, the utilitarian thinks that you will be irrational 
to regret that you did it, for you will have done what is in the straightforward sense the 
right thing.
   A Kantian approach, by defining a determinate ideal of conduct to live up 
to rather than setting a goal  of action to strive for, solves the problem about integrity, 
but with a high price.  The advantage of the Kantian approach is the definite sphere of 
responsibility.  Your share of the responsibility for the way the world is is well-defined 
and limited, and if you act as you ought, bad outcomes are not your responsibility.  The 
trouble is that in cases such as that of the murderer at the door it seems grotesque 
simply to say that I have done my part by telling the truth and the bad results are not 
my responsibility.   
  The point of a double-level theory is to give us both a definite and well-defined 
sphere of responsibility for everyday life and some guidance, at least, about when we 
may or must take the responsibility of violating ideal standards.  The common sense 
approach to this problem uses an intuitive quantitative measure:  we depart from our 
ordinary  rules  and  standards  of  conduct  when  the  consequences  of  following  them 
would be "very bad."  This is unhelpful for two reasons.  First, it leaves us on our own 
about  determining  how  bad.  Second,  the  attempt  to  justify  it  leads  down  a  familiar 
consequentialist  slippery  slope:    if  very  bad  consequences  justify  a  departure  from 
ordinary norms, why  do  not  slightly  bad consequences  justify  such a  departure?   A 
double-level theory substitutes something better than this rough quantitative measure.  
In Rawls's theory, for example, a departure from equal liberty cannot be justified by the 
fact that the consequences of liberty are "very  bad" in terms of mere  efficiency. This 
does  not  mean  that  an  endless  amount  of  inefficiency  will  be  tolerated,  because 
presumably at some point the inefficiency may interfere with the effectiveness of liberty.  
One might put the point this way:  the measure of "very bad" is not entirely intuitive but 
rather,  bad  enough  to  interfere  with  the  reality  of  liberty.    Of  course  this  is  not  an 
algorithmic criterion and cannot be applied without judgment, but it is not as inexact 
as  a  wholly  intuitive  quantitative  measure,  and,  importantly,  does  not  lead  to  a 
consequentialist slippery slope. 
   Another advantage of a double-level theory is the explanation it offers of  the 
other phenomenon which Williams is concerned about:  that of regret for doing a certain 
kind of action  even if  in the circumstances  it  was the "right" thing.  A  double-level 
theory offers an account of at least some of the occasions for this kind of regret.  We will 
regret  having to depart  from the ideal  standard of conduct,  for  we identify  with this 
standard and think of our autonomy in terms of it.  Regret for an action we would not 
do under ideal circumstances seems appropriate even if we have done what is clearly 
the right thing.
  
 
Kantian Non-Ideal Theory 
  Rawls's special conception of justice is a stricter version of the egalitarian idea 
embodied  in  his  general  conception.    In  the  same  way,  it  can  be  argued  that  the 
Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of Humanity are expressions of the same 
idea - that humanity is the source of value, and of the justifying force of reason.   But 
the Formula of Humanity is stricter, and gives implausible answers when we are dealing 
with the misconduct of others and the recalcitrance of nature.  This comparison gives 
rise to the idea of using the two formulas and the relation between them to construct a 
Kantian double-level theory of individual morality, with the advantages of that sort of 
account.  The Formulas of Humanity and the Kingdom of Ends will provide the ideals 
which govern our daily conduct.  When dealing with evil circumstances we may depart 
from this ideal.  In such cases, we can say that the Formula of Humanity is inapplicable 
because it is not designed for use when dealing with evil.  But it can still guide our 
conduct.  It  defines the goal towards which we are working, and if we  can generate 
priority rules we will know which features of it are most important.  It gives us guidance 
about which of the measures we may take is the least objectionable.  
  Lying to deceivers is not the only case in which the Formula of Humanity seems 
to set us a more ideal standard than the Formula of Universal Law.  The arguments 
made about lying  can all  be made about the use of coercion to deal  with  evil-doers.   
Another, very difficult case in which the two formulas give different results, as I think, 
is the case of suicide.  Kant gives an argument against suicide under the Formula of 
Universal  Law,  but  that  argument  does  not  work.
      Yet  under  the  Formula  of 
Humanity we can give a clear and compelling argument against suicide:  nothing is of 
any value unless the human person is so, and it is a great crime, as well as a kind of 
incoherence, to act in a way that denies and eradicates the source of all value. Thus it 
might  be  possible  to  say  that  suicide  is  wrong  from  an  ideal  point  of  view,  though 
justifiable in circumstances of very great natural or moral evil. 
    There is also another, rather different sense of "rigorism" in which the Formula 
of Humanity seems to be more rigorous than that of Universal Law.  It concerns the 
question whether Kant's theory allows for the category of merely permissible ends and 
actions, or whether we must always be doing something that is morally worthy:  that is, 
whether we should always pursue the obligatory ends of our own perfection and the 
happiness of others, when no other duty is in the case. 
  The Formula of Universal Law clearly allows for the category of the permissible.  
Indeed, the first contradiction test is a test of permissibility.   But in the Metaphysical 
Principles of Virtue, there are passages which have sometimes been taken to imply that 
Kant holds the view that  our  conduct should always  be informed  by morally worthy 
ends. (MMV 390/48) The textual evidence is not decisive. But the tendency in Kant's 
thought is certainly there:  for complete moral worth is only realized when our actions 
are  not  merely  in  accordance  with  duty  but  from  duty,  or,  to  say  the  same  thing  a 
different  way,  perfect  autonomy  is  only  realized  when  our  actions  and  ends  are 
completely determined by reason, and this seems to be the case only when our ends are 
chosen as instantiations of the obligatory ends. 
  Using the Formula of Humanity it is possible to argue for the more "rigorous" 
interpretation.  First, the obligatory ends can be derived more straightforwardly from 
Humanity than from Universal Law.   Kant does derive the obligatory ends from the 
Formula  of  Universal  Law,  but  he  does  it  by  a  curiously  round-about  procedure  in 
which someone is imagined formulating a maxim of rejecting them and then finding it 
to be impermissible.  This argument does not show that there would be a moral failing if 
the agent merely unthinkingly neglected rather than rejecting these ends.  The point 
about the pervasiveness of these ends in the moral life is a more complicated one, one 
that follows from their adoption by this route:  Among the obligatory ends is our own 
moral perfection.   Pursuing  ends that are  determined  by  reason,  rather than merely 
acceptable  to  it,  cultivates  one's  moral  perfection  in  the  required    way.  (MMV  380-
381/37-38; 444-447/108-111) 
  It is important to point out that even if this is the correct way to understand 
Kant's  ideal  theory,  it  does  not  imply  that  Kantian  ethics  commands  a  life  of 
conventional moral "good deeds."   The obligatory ends are one's own perfection and the 
happiness of others; to be governed by them is to choose instantiations of these larger 
categories as the aim of your vocation and other everyday activities.  It is worth keeping 
in  mind  that  natural  perfection  is  a  large  category,  including  all  the  activities  that 
cultivate body and mind.  Kant's point is not to introduce a strenuous moralism but to 
find a place for the values of perfectionism in his theory.  But this perfectionism will be 
a part of ideal theory if the argument for it is based on the Formula of Humanity and 
cannot  be  derived  from  that  of  Universal  Law.    This  seems  to  me  to  be  a  desirable 
outcome.    People  in  stultifying  economic  or  eductational  conditions  cannot  really  be 
expected to devote all their spare time to the cultivation of perfectionist values.  But 
they  can  be  expected not to do what is impermissible, not to  violate the  Formula of 
Universal Law.  Here again, the Formula of Humanity sheds light on the situation even 
if  it  is  not  directly  applied:    it  tells  us  why  it  is  morally  as  well  as  in  other  ways 
regrettable that people should be in such conditions. 
 
Conclusion 
  If the account that I have given is correct, the resources of a double-level theory 
may be available to the Kantian.  The Formula of Humanity and its corollary, the vision 
of a Kingdom of Ends, provide an ideal to live up to in daily life as well as a long term 
political and moral goal for humanity.  But it is not feasible always to live up to this 
ideal, and where the attempt to live up to it would make you a tool of evil, you should 
not do so.  In evil circumstances, but only then, the Kingdom of Ends can become a 
goal  to  seek  rather  than  an  ideal  to  live  up  to,  and  this  will  provide  us  with  some 
guidance. The Kantian priorities - of justice over the pursuit of obligatory ends, and of 
respect over benevolence - still help us to see what matters most.  And even in the worst 
circumstances, there is always the Formula of Universal Law, telling us what we must 
in not in any case do.  For whatever bad circumstances may drive us to do, we cannot 
possibly  be  justified  in  doing  something  which  others  in  those  same  circumstances 
could not also do.  The Formula of Universal Law provides the point at which morality 
becomes uncompromising. 
  Let me close with some reflections about the extent to which Kant himself might 
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portrayed Kant as an uncompromising idealist, and there is much to support this view.  
But in the historical and political writings, as well as in the Lectures on Ethics, we find a 
somewhat  different  attitude.    This  seems  to  me  to  be  especially  important:      Kant 
believes  that  the  Kingdom  of  Ends  on  earth,  the  highest  political  good,  can  only  be 
realized in a condition of peace. (MMJ 354-355/127-129)  But he does not think that 
this commits a nation to a simple pacifism that would make it the easy victim of its 
enemies.      Instead,  he  draws  up  laws  of  war  in  which  peace  functions  not  as  an 
uncompromising ideal to be lived up to in the present but as a long range goal which 
guides  our  conduct  even  when  war  is  necessary.  (PP  343-348/85-91;  MMJ  343-
351/114-125)  If a Kantian can hold such a view for the conduct of nations, why not for 
that of individuals? If this is right, the task of Kantian moral philosophy is to draw up 
for individuals  something analogous to Kant's laws of war:  special  principles to use 
when dealing with evil. 
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 This paper was delivered as the Randall Harris Lecture at Harvard in October, 1985.   
Versions  of  the  paper  have  been  presented  at  the  University  of  Illinois  at  Urbana-
Champaign, the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, the University of Michigan, and 
to the Seminar on Contemporary Social and Political Theory at Chicago.  I owe a great 
deal to the discussions on these occasions.   I want to thank the following people for 
their comments:  Margaret Atherton, Charles Chastain, David Copp, Stephen Darwall, 
Michael  Davis,  Gerald  Dworkin,  Alan  Gewirth,  David  Greenstone,  John  Koethe,  
Richard Kraut, Richard Strier, and Manley  Thompson.   And I  owe  special thanks to 
Peter Hylton and Andrews Reath for extensive and useful comments on the early written 
versions of the paper. 
  Where I have cited or referred to any of Kant's works more than once in this paper I 
have inserted the reference into the text.  The following abbreviations are used:   
G     Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.(1785)  The first page number is that of 
the Prussian Academy Edition Volume IV; the second is that of the translation by Lewis 
White Beck. Indianapolis:   Bobbs-Merrill Library of Liberal Arts, 1959.  
C2    Critique  of  Practical  Reason.  (1788)    Prussian  Academy  Volume  V;    Lewis  White 
Beck's translation. Indianapolis:  Bobbs-Merrill Library of Liberal Arts, 1956. 
MMV    The  Metaphysical  Principles  of  Virtue.  (1797)  Prussian  Academy  Volume  VI;  
James  Ellington's  translation  in  Immanuel  Kant:    Ethical  Philosophy.    Indianapolis:  
Hackett, 1983. 
    
MMJ  The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. (1797)  Prussian Academy Volume VI; John 
Ladd's translation. Indianapolis:  Bobbs-Merrill Library of Liberal Arts, 1965. 
PP   Perpetual Peace. (1795) Prussian Academy Volume VIII, translation by Lewis White 
Beck in On History, edited by Lewis White Beck.  Indianapolis:   Bobbs-Merrill Library of 
Liberal Arts, 1963. 
SRL   "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives" (1797) Prussian Academy 
Volume VIII; translation by Lewis White Beck in Immanuel Kant:  Critique of Practical 
Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 
1949;  rpt:  New York:  Garland Publishing Company, 1976. 
LE     Lectures on Ethics.(1775-1780) edited by Paul Menzer from the notes of Theodor 
Friedrich Brauer, using the notes of Gottlieb Kutzner and Chr. Mrongovius; translated 
by  Louis  Infield.    London:    Methuen  &  Co.,  Ltd.,  1930;  rpt:    New  York,  Harper 
Torchbooks, 1963;  current rpt:  Indianapolis,  Hackett Press.  
  I defend it in "Kant's Formula of Universal Law", forthcoming in Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly. 
  I am relying on an assumption here, which is that when people ask us questions they 
give  us  some  account  of  themselves  and  of  the  context  in  which  the  questions  are 
asked.  Or, if they don't, it is because they are relying on a context that is assumed.  If 
someone comes to  your  door looking for  someone, you assume that there's a  family 
emergency or some such thing.  I am prepared to count such reliance as deception if 
the questioner knows about it and uses it, thinking that we would refuse to answer his 
questions  if  we  knew  the  real  context  to  be  otherwise.    Sometimes  people  ask  me, 
"Suppose the murderer just asks whether his friend is in your house, without saying 
anything about why he wants to know?"  I think that, in our culture anyway, people do 
not  just  ask  questions  of  each  other  about  anything  except  the  time  of  day  and 
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unsatisfactory way of dealing with this case is that it will almost inevitably give rise to 
suspicion  of  the  truth,  and  this  is  because  people  normally  answer  such  questions.  
Perhaps if we did live in a culture in which people regularly just asked  questions in the 
way  suggested, refusal to answer would  be commonplace and  would not  give rise to 
suspicion;  it would not even be considered odd or rude.  Otherwise there would be no 
way to maintain privacy.  
  In fact, it will now be the case that if the murderer supposes that you suspect him, he 
is not going to ask you, knowing that you will answer so as to deceive him.  Since we 
must avoid the silly problem about the murderer being able to deduce the truth from 
his  knowledge  that  you  will  speak  falsely,  what  you  announce  is  that  you  will  say 
whatever is necessary in order to conceal the truth.  There is no reason to suppose that 
you  will  be  mechanical  about  this.    You  are  not  going  to  be  a  reliable  source  of 
information.  The murderer will therefore seek some other way to locate his victim.  
  On the other hand, suppose that the murderer does, contrary to my supposition, 
announce his real intentions.  Then the arguments that I have given do not apply.  In 
this case, I believe, your only recourse is refusal to answer (whether or not the victim is 
in your house, or you know his whereabouts).  If an answer is extorted from you by 
force you may lie, according to the argument I will give later in the paper. 
 Kant himself takes notice of this sort of problem in a footnote to this passage in which 
he criticizes Golden-Rule type principles for, among other things, the sort of subjectivity 
in  question:    such  principles  cannot  establish  the  duty  of  beneficence,  for  instance, 
because  "many  a  man  would  gladly  consent  that  others  should  not  benefit  him, 
provided  only  that  he  might  be  excused  from  showing  benevolence  to  them."    (G 
430n/48n)   
  Sometimes it is objected that someone could assent to being lied to in advance of the 
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One  can therefore agree to  be  deceived.   I think  it  depends  what circumstances are 
envisioned.  I can certainly agree to remain uninformed about something, but this is not 
the same as agreeing to be deceived.  I could say to a doctor:  "don't tell me if I am 
fatally ill, even if I ask" for instance.  But if I then do ask the doctor whether I am fatally 
ill,  I  cannot  be  certain  whether  she  will  answer  me  truly.    Perhaps  what's  being 
envisioned is that I simply agree to be lied to, but not about anything in particular.  Will 
I then trust the person with whom I've made this odd agreement?   
    A  similar  conclusion  about  the  way  in  which  the  Formula  of  Humanity  makes 
coercion  and  deception  wrong  is  reached  by  Onora  O'Neill  in  "Between  Consenting 
Adults," Philosophy and Public Affairs  Volume 14, No. 3 (Summer, 1985), pp. 252-277. 
 Immanuel  Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  Reason, translated  by  Norman Kemp Smith.  (New 
York:  St. Martin's Press, 1965)  A738-739/B766-767, p. 593. 
  It is perhaps also relevant that in Kant's discussion of perfect moral friendship the 
emphasis  is  not  on  good  will  towards  one  another  but  on  complete  confidence  and 
openness.  See MMV 471-472/139-139. 
    Some evidence that Kant is concerned with this sort of thing may be found in the 
fact that he identifies two meanings of the word "prudence" (Klugheit);   "The former 
sense means the skill of a man in having an influence on others so as to use them for 
his own purposes.  The latter is the ability to unite all these purposes to his own lasting 
advantage."  (G 416n/33n)  A similar remark is found in Anthropology from a Pragmatic 
Point  of  View.  (1798)    See  the  translation  by  Mary  J.  Gregor  (The  Hague:    Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1974) p. 183.  Prussian Academy Edition Volume VII, p.322. 
  I call this view Socratic because of Socrates's concern with the differences between 
reason and persuasion and, in particular, because in the Apology, he makes a case for 
the categorical duty of straightforwardness.  Socrates and Plato are also concerned with 
a troublesome feature of this moral view that Kant neglects.   An argument must come 
    
packaged in some sort of presentation, and one may well object that it is impossible to 
make a straightforward presentation of a case to someone who is close to or admires 
you,  without  emphasis,  without  style,  without  taking  some  sort  of  advantage  of 
whatever it is about you that has your listener's attention in the first place.  So how can 
we  avoid  the  non-rational  influence  of  others?    I  take  it  that  most  obviously  in  the 
Symposium, but also in other dialogues concerned with the relation of love and teaching 
such as the Phaedrus,  Plato is at work on the question whether you can use your sex 
appeal to draw another's attention to the reasons he has for believing or doing things, 
rather than as a distraction that aids your case illicitly. 
 Of course you may also resist force with lies, if resisting it with force is not an option 
for you.  This gives rise to a question about whether these options are on a footing with 
each other.  In many cases, lying will be the better option.  This is because when you 
use  coercion  you  risk  doing  injury  to  the  person  you  coerce.    Injuring  people 
unnecessarily is wrong, a wrong that should be distinguished from the use of coercion.  
When you lie you do not risk doing this extra wrong.  But Kant thinks that lying is in 
itself  worse  than  coercion,  because  of  the  peculiarly  direct  way  in  which  it  violates 
autonomy.  So it should follow that if you can deal with the murderer by coercion, this 
is a better  option than lying. Others seem to share this intuition.  Cardinal John Henry 
Newman, responding to Samuel Johnson's claim that he would lie to a murderer who 
asked which way his victim had gone, suggests that the appropriate thing to do is "to 
knock the man down, and to call out for the police." (Apologia Pro Vita Sua:  Being  a 
History of His  Religious Opinions.  (London:  Longmans, Green & Co., 1880) p. 361.  I 
am quoting from Sissela Bok, Lying. (New York:  Vintage Books, 1979) p 42.)  If you can 
do it without seriously hurting the murderer, it is, so to speak, cleaner just to kick him 
off the front porch than to lie.  This treats the  murderer himself more like a human 
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 I owe this example to John Koethe.  
 For a discussion of this question see Barbara Herman, "Mutual Aid and Respect for 
Persons" Ethics 94 (July 1984) pp. 577-602. 
  In the Lectures on Ethics, Kant takes the position that you may lie to someone who 
lies to or bullies you as long as you don't say specifically that your words will be true.  
He claims this is not lying, because such a person should not expect you to tell the 
truth.  (LE  227,229) 
  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice.  Cambridge, Massachusetts:  Harvard University 
Press, 1971. Section and page numbers referring to this work will appear in the text.  
  In a non-ideal case, one's actions may be guided by a more instrumental style of 
reasoning than in ideal theory.  But non-ideal theory is not a form of consequentialism.  
There are two reasons for this.  One is that the goal set by the ideal is not just one of 
good consequences, but of a just state of affairs.  If a consequentialist view is one that 
defines right action entirely in terms of good consequences (which are not themselves 
defined in terms of considerations of rightness or justice) then non-ideal theory is not 
consequentialist.  The second reason is that the ideal will also guide our choice among 
non-ideal  alternatives,  importing  criteria  for  this  choice  other  than  effectiveness.    I 
would  like  to  thank  Alan  Gewirth  for  prompting  me  to  clarify  my  thoughts  on  this 
matter, and David Greenstone for helping me to do so. 
 See the "Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason" of the Critique of Practical Reason, and the 
Critique of Teleological Judgment, §87. 
  Bernard Williams, in Utilitarianism For and Against, by J.J.C. Smart and  Bernard 
Williams  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 75-150. 
 Williams also takes this issue up in "Ethical Consistency" originally published in the 
Supplementary Volumes to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society  XXXIX, 1965, and 
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reprinted in his collection Problems of the Self (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
1973), pp. 166-186. 
 It is important here to distinguish two kinds of exceptions.  As Rawls points out in 
"Two  Conceptions of Rules" (The Philosophical Review, Volume  64 (January  1965)), a 
practice such as promising may have certain exceptions built into it.  Everyone who has 
learned the practice understands that the obligation to keep the promise is cancelled if 
one  of  these  obtains.    When  one  breaks  a  promise  because  this  sort  of  exception 
obtains, regret would be inappropriate and obsessive.  And these sorts of exceptions 
may  occur  even  in  "ideal"  circumstances.    The  kind  of  exception  one  makes  when 
dealing with evil should be distinguished from exceptions built into practices. 
 Kant's argument depends on a teleological claim:  that the instinct whose office is to 
impel  the  improvement  of  life  cannot  universally  be  used  to  destroy  life  without 
contradiction.  (G 422/40)  But as I understand the contradiction in conception test, 
teleological claims have no real place in it.  What matters is not whether nature assigns 
a certain purpose to a certain motive or instinct, but whether everyone with the same 
motive or instinct could act in the way proposed and still achieve their purpose.  There 
is simply  no  argument to show that  everyone suffering from  acute  misery could not 
commit suicide and still achieve the purpose of ending that misery. 